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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
NATURALIZATION AND WILLINGNESS TO TAKE UP ARMS
"If necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this
country ?"'
Is this a necessary and proper question to require an alien to answer
on his application for naturalization? Apparently, under the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Girouard case, 2
it is not.
The people of the United States, through the Constitution, have
delegated to Congress the power to regulate naturalization.3 In exer-
cising this power, Congress has enacted several laws affecting natur-
alization,4 in each of which it has required an alien, before admission to
citizenship, to declare on oath in open court substantially as follows:
"I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely re-
nounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which I have hereto-
fore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America against
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith
and allegiance to the same; and that I take this obligation freely
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion: So
help me God."5
Congress also required the court to be satisfied that the alien had
"behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles
of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good
order and happiness of the same" during the five year period im-
mediately preceding the date of his application for naturalization.
No doubt Congress intended that the answer to the question: "If
necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country ?",
should give the court information of assistance in determining whether
the applicant was "attached to the principles of the Constitution of
the United States" and whether he could declare "without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion" that he would "support and defend
the Constitution and laws" of the nation. But, did Congress intend
that an unqualified affirmative willingness to bear arms in defense of
this country should be a prerequisite to the granting of naturalization?
1 Question 22 of the Application for Naturalization.
2 Girouard v. United States, 66 S.Ct. 826 (1946).
U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8: "The Congress shall have power *** To establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization, * * *"
4 For example: Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596; Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 889; Nationality Act of October 14,
1940, 54 Stat. 1137; Second War Powers Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 176; and Act of
December 7, 1942, 56 Stat. 1041.
554 Stat. 1157, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 735(b), 8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 735(b).6 Naturalization Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 596, Sec. 4.
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In the Schwinmmer case, 7 the applicant for naturalization was a
woman who was born in Hungary in 1877 and was a citizen of that
country. She came to the United States to visit and lecture in 1921
and within a few months after her arrival declared her intention to
become a citizen. She filed petition for naturalization in September,
1926. In her application she answered "I would not take up arms per-
sonally" to the question "If necessary, are you willing to take up arms
in defense of this country ?"
At the hearing, a statement made by her in private correspondence:
"I am an uncompromising pacifist. . . I have no sense of nationalism,
only a cosmic consciousness of belonging to the human family", was
introduced in evidence. She testified "If . . . the United States can
compel its women citizens to take up arms in the defense of the country
- something that no other civilized government has ever attempted -
I would not be able to comply with this requirement of American
citizenship. In this case I would recognize the right of the Govern-
ment to deal with me as it is- dealing with "its male citizens who for
conscientious reasons refuse to take up arms." She further stated
that she had occasionally glanced through Hungarian, French, German,
Dutch, Scandinavian, and Italian publications, and said she could
imagine finding in meetings and publications attacks on the American
form of government and would conceive it her duty to uphold the
Constitution against such attacks. And she testified further, "I am
always ready to tell anyone who wants to know it that I am an
uncompromising pacifist and will not fight."
The Supreme Court, on Writ of Certiorari, denied the petition
for naturalization; justices Holmes, Brandeis and Sanford dissenting.
The court quoted from the Manzi case :8 "Citizenship is a high privilege
and when doubts exist concerning a grant of it, generally, at least,
they should be resolved in favor of the United States and against the
claimant." The court further stated:9
"Whatever tends to lessen the willingness of citizens to dis-
charge their duty to bear arms in the country's defense detracts
from the strength and safety of the Government. * * * The fact
that, by reason of sex, age or other cause, they may be unfit
to serve does not lessen their purpose or power to influence
others."
In Macintosh case,"' the applicant for naturalization was born
in the Dominion of Canada, came to the United States in 1916, and
7 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 49 S.Ct 448, 73 L.Ed. 889 (1929).
For comments on this case see Pugh, 3 U. Cin. L. R. 462 (1929), and Gray,
7 N.Y.U.L.Q. 723 (1930).
8 United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463 at p. 467, 48 S.Ct. 328, 72 L.Ed. 654 (1928).
9 United States v. Schwimmer, supra, note 7,_t p. 650.
1o United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 51 S.Ct. 570, 75 L.Ed. 1302 (1931).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
in 1925 declared his intention to become a citizen. His answer to
question 22 on the application; "If necessary, are you willing to take
up arms in defense of this country?", was: "Yes, but I should want
to be free to judge of the necessity." In a written memorandum subse-
quently filed, he amplified his answer by the following:
"I am willing to do what I judge to be in the best interests
of my country, but only in so far as I can believe that this is
not going to be against the best interests of humanity in the long
run. I do not undertake to support 'my country right or wrong'
in any dispute which may arise, and I am not willing to promise
beforehand, and without knowing the cause for which my
country may go to war, either that I will or that I will not
'take up arms in defense of this country,' however 'necessary'
the war may seem to be to the Government of the day."
On hearing before the District Court, Macintosh testified:
"* * * that he would answer question 22 in the affirmative
only on the understanding that he would have to believe that
the war was morally justified before he would take up arms
in it or give it his moral support. He was ready to give to the
United States all the allegiance he ever had given or ever could
give to any country, but he could not put allegiance to the
government of any country before allegiance to the will of God."
Again, the Supreme Court denied naturalization. In this case
Chief Justice Hughes dissented, and his dissent was concurred in by
Justices Brandeis and Stone. The majority opinion went to some
length in outlining the court's reasons for its decision, saying, in part:"'
"When he speaks of putting his allegiance to the will of God
above his allegiance to the government, it is evident, in the light
of his entire statement, that he means to make his owm inter-
pretation of the will of God the decisive test which shall con-
clude the government and stay its hand. * * *
"If the attitude of this claimant, as shown by his statements
and the inferences properly to be deduced from them, be held
immaterial to the question of fitness for admission to citizenship,
where shall the line be drawn? Upon what ground of distinction
may we hereafter reject another applicant who shall express
his willingness to respect any particular principle of the Consti-
tution or obey any future statute only upon the condition that
he shall entertain the opinion that it is morally justified ?"
The Bland case 2 was argued to the court immediately following
the Macintosh case. Here the applicant refused to take the oath of
allegiance to "* * * defend the Constitution and laws of the United
States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic ;" except
with the written interpolation of the words, "as far as my conscience
11 Ibid. at p. 625.
12United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636, 51 S.Ct. 569, 75 L.Ed. 1319 (1931).
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as a Christian will allow." The Supreme Court said:"' "The words
of the statute do not admit of the qualification upon which applicant
insists," and denied naturalization, saying that this case was governed
by the Macintosh case.
Fifteen years after the Macintosh and Bland cases, the problem
of whether or not to admit to citizenship one who refused to give an
unqualified answer to the question: "If necessary are you willing to
take up arms in defense of this country?", was again brought before
the Supreme Court for decision in the case of Girouard v. United
States."4 The applicant's answer in this case was "No (Non-combatant)
Seventh Day Adventist." He explained his answer by saying: "it
is a purely religious matter with me, I have no political or personal
reasons other than that." Before his Selective Service board, the
applicant did not claim exemption from all military service, but only
from combatant military duty. He was willing to serve in the army
but would not bear arms. The court concluded that: "the Schwimmer,
Macintosh and Bland cases do not state the correct rule of law", "
and reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals,'" which
had reversed an order admitting the applicant to citizenship. And
again there were three justices who dissented, the dissenting opinion
being given by Chief Justice Stone, in which Justices Reed and Frank-
furter concurred.
In the opinion of the court, the fallacies underlying the general
rule of the Schwimmer, Macintosh and Bland cases were demonstrated
in the dissents of Justice Holmes in the Schwimrner case, and of
Chief Justice Hughes in the Macintosh case. The fallacies pointed
out are: (1) the oath required of aliens does not in terms require
that they promise to bear arms, (2) the bearing of arms, important
as it is, is not the only way in which our constitution may be sup-
ported and defended, even in times of great peril, and (3) "there is
not the slightest suggestion that Congress set a stricter standard for
aliens seeking admission to citizenship than it did for officials who
make and enforce the laws of the nation and administer its affairs."
The words of the oath of allegiance: "* * * I will support and
defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America
against all enemies, foreign and domestic", do not, of themselves, mean:
"I am willing to take up arms." Nor do the words of the Naturaliza-
tion Act of 1906"" that no person shall be naturalized unless he has
been for stated periods and still is; "a person of good moral character,
u Ibid. at p. 637.
1466 S.Ct. 826 (1946).
'I Ibid. at p. 830.
16 149 F. 2d 760 (1945).
17 34 Stat. 596, Sec. 4.
19461
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and
well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States",
have such a meaning.
The court pointed out that nuclear physicists, lathe workers, seamen
on cargo vessels, construction battalions, nurses, engineers, litter bear-
ers, doctors and chaplains all made essential contributions to the great
cooperative effort necessary for victory in a total war in its modem
form. Devotion to one's country can be as real and as enduring among
non-combatants as among combatants. One may adhere to what he
deems to be his obligation to God and yet assume all military risks
to secure victory.
In pointing up the third fallacy, the court said :18 "While Article
VI, Clause 3 of the Constitution provides that such officials (members
of Congress or other public officers), both of the United States and
the several States, 'shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
this Constitution,' it significantly adds that 'no religious Test shall ever
be required as a Qualification to any Office or Public Trust under the
United States'." The court found that this oath differed in no material
respect from that prescribed for aliens and that,'19 "There is not the
slightest suggestion that Congress set a stricter standard for aliens
seeking admission to citizenship than it did for officials who make
and enforce the laws of the nation and administer its affairs."
The court then directed its attention to the Selective Training
and Service Act of 194020 and to the Second War Powers Act,2 and
stated that the oath required of those inducted into the armed services
includes the provision "that I will bear true faith and allegiance to
the United States of America; that I will serve them honestly and
fairly against all their enemies whomsoever," and that Congress had
provided the means whereby aliens serving as non-combatants in the
armed services could gain citizenship by taking the same oath as
required of any alien seeking naturalization, which contains the words
"support and defend the Constitution." From these facts, the court
argued that the oath could" "hardly be adequate for one who is un-
willing to bear arms because of religious scruples and yet exact from
another a promise to bear arms despite religious scruples."
In view of the decision of the Girouard case, should question 22
on the application be changed to read: "If necessary, do you object,
for other than religious reasons, to taking up arms in defense of this
country?" An affirmative answer to this question would indicate an
1866 S.Ct. 826, at p. 828.
19 Ibid. at p. 828.
20 54 Stat. 889.
21 56 Stat. 176.
2266 S.Ct. 826, at p. 829
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unwillingness to take up arms, but, such unwillingness, being based
upon reasons other than religious scruples, would not bar the Govern-
ment under the Constitution from imposing the will of the many
upon the one who so indicated his unwillingness to take up arms.
Suppose, next, that the question be retained in its present form, and
that further information be sought by adding: "If your answer to this
question is other than 'Yes', give reasons." This would give the appli-
cant the opportunity to state that his reasons for refusing to bear
arms were based on religious scruples or on other grounds. A refusal
to bear arms because of religious scruples would be no bar to the
applicant's naturalization under the rule of the Girouard case, and
a refusal to bear arms for other reasons would be no bar to his
naturalization because the oath required of aliens does not in terms
require that they promise to bear arms. It would appear then, that
no answer to the question either in its present form, or as it might
be amended, would act as a bar to the applicant being admitted to
citizenship. Any answer given would be inere information. Why,
then, retain the question: "If necessary, are you willing to take up
arms in defense of this country?"
But, in adopting this line of reasoning are we not forgetting the
meaning behind the words of Justice Butler in the opinion of the
court in the Schwimmer case :23 "Whatever tends to lessen the willing-
ness of citizens to discharge their duty to bear arms in the country's
defense detracts from the strength and safety of the Government?"
In the words of Justice Sutherland in the Macintosh case,21 are we
not allowing the applicant to make "his own interpretation of the will
of God the decisive test which shall conclude the government and
stay its hand," and are we not making "bargains with those who seek
naturalization?" Are we to admit into citizenship an alien who "* * *
is unwilling to rely, as every native born citizen is obliged to do,
upon the probable continuance by Congress of the long established
and approved practice of exempting the honest conscientious ob-
jector ?"
Are "We the People of the United States" 2 to welcome to our
citizenship all those who seek justice, domestic tranquility, the com-
mon defense, the general welfare and the blessings of liberty with
us; who are willing to be lathe workers, nuclear physicists, welders,
or ship builders; but who are not willing to take up arms to defend
those rights and privileges which they seek to enjoy?
23 United States v. Schwimmer, supra, note 7, at p. 650.
24 United States v. McIntosh, supra, note 10, at p. 625.
25 Ibid. at p. 625.
26 Preamble to the Constitution of the United States of America.
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Chief Justice Stone read the dissenting opinion in the Girouard
case, of approximately the same length as the opinion of the court.
It was the last opinion to be read by the Chief Justice in his long
and honored career. In this very strong dissent, in which he was
joined by Justices Reed and Frankfurter, the Chief Justice spoke for
an affirmation of the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals,2
which reversed an order admitting the applicant to citizenship, "For
the reason that the court below, in applying the controlling provisions
of the naturalization statutes, correctly applied them as earlier con-
strued by this Court, whose construction Congress has adopted and
confirmed. '12
The Chief Justice pointed out that over a period of eleven years
following the decisions in the Macintosh and Bland cases, six succes-
sive Congresses had made active, publicized legislative attacks upon
the construction of the naturalization statutes as adopted by the court
in its decisions in the Schwimmer, Macintosh and Bland cases. All
of the measures proposed to Congress provided, in effect, that no
person otherwise qualified "shall be debarred from citizenship by
reason of his or her religious views or philosophical opinions with
respect to the lawfulness of war as a means of settling international
disputes, but every alien admitted to citizenship shall be subject to the
same obligation as the native-born citizen".29 Congress declined to
adopt these proposals and, in the Act of 1940,80 incorporated the very
form of oath which had been administratively prescribed for the ap-
plicants in the Schwimmer, Macintosh and Bland cases.3' The Chief
Justice concluded :32 "By thus adopting and confirming this Court's
construction of what Congress had enacted in the Naturalization Act
of 1906 Congress gave that construction the same legal significance
as though it had written the very words into the Act of 1940."
Did Congress repeal this construction by enactment of the 1942
amendments of the Nationality Act? In 1942 Congress granted special
favors to those seeking naturalization who had worn the uniform and
rendered military service in time of war and could satisfy such
naturalization requirements as had not been dispensed with by the
amendments, and specifically provided that the amendment should
not apply to "any conscientious objector who performed no military
duty whatever or refused to wear the uniform."' 3  The effect of these
amendments was to exempt conscientious objectors who had rendered
27 149 F. 2d 760 (1945).
28 66 S.Ct. 826, at p. 830.
29 H.R. 297, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced December 8. 1931.
2054 Stat. 1137, Sec. 307(a), 8 U.S.C., Sec. 707(a), 8 U.S.C.A., Sec. 707(a).
S' Naturalization Regulations of July 1, 1929, Rule 8(c).
3266 S.Ct. 826, at p. 833.
as 8 U.S.C. Supp. IV, Sec. 1004, 8 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1004.
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military service in uniform from the requirements of the oath to
"support and defend the Constitution," which exemption was not ex-
tended to conscientious objectors who had not rendered such service
nor worn the uniform. Thus Girouard, who had not rendered military
service nor worn the uniform, should not be included under those
exempt from the requirements of the oath by the 1942 amendments.
Chief Justice Stone concluded his dissent tersely,34 "The amend-
ments and their legislative history give no hint of any purpose of
Congress to relax, at least for persons who had rendered no military
service, the requirements of the oath of allegiance and proof of attach-
ment to the Constitution as this Court had interpreted them and as
the Nationality Act of 1940 plainly required them to be interpreted.
It is not the function of this Court to disregard the will of Congress
in the exercise of its constitutional power."
JosEPH A. BETHEL
34 66 S.Ct. 826, at p. 834.
